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**CANADA'S PERCEPTION OF DEMOCRATIC DEVELOPMENT
IN INDEPENDENT UKRAINE**

The article is devoted to a general overview of Canada's attitudes to the democratic development of post-Soviet Ukraine. The article examines the position and opinion of both official and diasporas' Canada on the development of democracy in Ukraine. It is determined that Ukraine's independence was a kind of signal to the beginning of intensive Canadian cooperation and support for the Ukraine's transition from a command-administrative economy to a free market. Another important area of support was the building of democratic institutions and civil society. Official Canadian assistance came through a number of channels, but the main institution was the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Another powerful force and initiator of many projects and support programs was the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada. We can talk about three main events that contributed to the revival of attention from official Canada to Ukraine: the declaration of Independence in 1991, the Orange Revolution in 2004 and Euromaidan and the Revolution of Dignity in late 2013. Each of these

events was positively assessed by Canada (as official and diasporas'), and was interpreted as an impetus for potential progress towards democracy. Despite the positive attitude to the development of transit to democracy in post-Soviet Ukraine, Canada is critical of the pace of this transit and the quality of transformation processes. At the same time, representatives of the Diaspora are more outspoken in their criticism of the problems in Ukraine. Among the main obstacles on this path we can name corruption, inhibition of reforms, institutional weakness, confrontation between supporters and opponents of reforms and regional clans since 2014. After the annexation of Crimea by Russia the external factor is also considered. Canada is helping Ukraine strongly in the fight against Russian aggression by providing technical, financial and diplomatic assistance.

Key words: *Canada, Ukraine, democracy, aid.*

1. INTRODUCTION

Formulation of the problem. The revival of Ukrainian state was started by two basic documents – Declaration of State sovereignty of Ukraine (1990) and The Act of Declaration of Independence of Ukraine (1991). In both acts the path towards democracy was announced as the main vector of the further development of Ukraine. Western states welcomed revolutionary events in the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union, and Canada was the first on the West in recognition of Ukraine's independence and sovereignty. Since 1991 Ukrainian transition towards free economy and democracy was actively supported by international community in a great number and variety of different programs and projects of financial, technical, and humanitarian aid. Canada was among the truest supporters of Ukraine, and this plays a positive role in democratic developments during the post-Soviet period. The scale and amount of assistance to Ukraine and other post-socialist countries indicates the importance of this support not only for the recipient countries but for donor countries as well. Ukraine occupies a specific place among the Canadian interests in Central and Eastern Europe. The overview of Canadian perceptions of the Ukraine's post-Soviet development will allow making some generalizations about the image of our country abroad and in Canada in particular, as well as about Ukrainian successes and fails in the process of the transition towards democracy.

Analysis of recent researches and publications. First, we have to note that mentioned above issues are already covered in a great variety of both scholar and mass-media publications. We can find two main groups of researches where the Canadian perceptions towards Ukraine's development of democracy are considered. The first one includes texts focused on the analy-

sis of the Ukraine's domestic progress in the field of democracy building. Among scholars of this group we can name Canadian author Marta Dyczok [1], Ukrainian scholars Mikhail Minakov [2], Yuliya Sytnyk [3] etc. Another group consists of studies dedicated to Canadian foreign policy towards Ukraine, and these studies rely on issues about democratic developments in Ukraine indirectly. For example, we can name articles by Ukrainian scholars Anton Bogdalov [4], Maryna Rabinovych [5], Nataliia Romanyuk [6]. A special attention should be paid to the book by Canadian researcher Bohdan S. Kordan «Strategic Friends: Canada-Ukraine Relations from Independence to the Euromaidan» (2018). It is dedicated to the analysis of the dynamics of the Canada-Ukraine relations in the context of post-Cold War geopolitical changes [7]. We also have to take into account a great variety of publications which concerns about Ukrainian Diaspora abroad and especially in Canada and its support to Ukraine during all years of independence. Many of those publications describe not only main activities of Canadian Diaspora, but also analyze the main challenges and problems of Ukraine's democratic development. We can find both general (for example Maryna Pashkevych, Viktor Pashkov, Daria Zaporozhets [8]) and more specialised (e.g. Bardyn Ihor [9]) researches.

The list of the authors whose works are directly or indirectly dedicated to the Canadian perceptions of Ukraine's post-Soviet development is not complete here. The main attention primarily was concentrated on such issues as development of democratic freedoms, rule of law, and path to the free market economy and economic prosperity. Subsequently these issues were supplemented by discussing such topics as human rights, reforms, and corruption. Since Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014 and aggression towards eastern parts of Ukraine there were added the discussions about sovereignty and territorial integrity as well as the development of the ethno-cultural situation in Ukraine.

The purpose of the article. In this article there is proposed an overview of Canadian perceptions of the democratic developments in independent Ukraine in such three dimensions as official rhetoric, media and Diaspora. First two are important because they influence on Canadian public opinion about Ukraine, and the third one is definable because Ukrainian Diaspora is the most devoted supporter of Ukraine in Canada and all over the globe. This material is a continuation of research conducted by Ukrainian and foreign researchers.

In general, Canadian perception of Ukraine's democratic development was mentioned in the great majority of the researches, but it was not the ob-

ject of the special analysis. All mentioned publications and other research materials together with official documents, declarations and remarks form a basis which makes it possible to analyze main trends in Canada's perception of Ukrainian path to the democracy.

2. RESULTS OF THE RESEARCH

Since the beginning of the official contacts between Canada and independent Ukraine on the state level, «democracy» became a universal slogan that embodied the main frame of Canada – Ukraine relations. This frame is presented in the fundamental documents which formed the basis of the Canada-Ukraine bilateral relationship.

'The Declaration on Relations between Ukraine and Canada' was the first document; it was signed and came into force on September 22, 1991. In this act, it was mentioned that Canada will respect the freely and democratically expressed choice of the people of Ukraine, and that future relations between two countries will be guided by the principles of international law. After Canada's recognition of Ukraine as an independent state (December 02, 1991) the next important document was the 'Joint Declaration on the establishment of diplomatic relations between Canada and Ukraine', signed on January 27, 1992. In this document, there is no direct reference to democracy, but there is an appeal to the Charter of Paris for a New Europe (1990) where a «new era of Democracy, Peace and Unity» was proclaimed. The universally recognized norms of international law, the principles of equality of states, the right of peoples to self-determination, sovereignty and independence, territorial integrity, and respect for human rights were declared in this Joint Declaration as the basis for the development of the bilateral cooperation. These norms and principles determine Canada-Ukraine relations on the international arena, while address to the Charter of Paris expresses compliance of such components of democracy as human rights, rule of law, fundamental freedoms, economic liberty, and social justice in the domestic affairs.

A common commitment to democracy and economic freedom are expressed in the majority of the next important documents (Joint Declaration on Special Partnership March 31, 1994; Agreement on Friendship and Cooperation October 24, 1994, Joint Declaration on Continuing Development of the Special Partnership between Canada and Ukraine December 5, 2001; Road Map of Priorities for Canada-Ukraine Relations September 24, 2009 [10]).

We have to note that democracy promotion strategy is an essential part of current Canadian foreign policy, so assistance in transit to democracy for

developing countries like Ukraine forms an important segment of such a strategy. Official Ottawa joined multilateral approach of the Western states to support nations of the Eastern Europe and former Soviet Union in their post-communist transformations. And Ukraine occupied a unique place among such countries.

As Mikhail Minakov mentions, in the early 1990s, there was a dominant optimistic perception in the context of the theory of ‘post-communist transition’ according to which Eastern European societies were to return to the ‘normal course of history,’ with its liberal democracy and market capitalism. As he claims, by the beginning of the twenty-first century, this optimism turned into a more realistic assessment of the deficiencies of post-Soviet democratization [2, p.172]. The same we can find in Canadian perceptions of the democratic developments in Ukraine.

Ukraine was considered as a country with good potential for quick and successful transit to a market economy and democratic politics. As Marta Dyczok points out, in first years «Ukraine went from being a little-known nation within a non-democratic state to an internationally recognized independent country» [1, p. xv].

Since 1991, Canada has invested considerable effort and resources in support of Ukraine in such main dimensions as democratic transformation, political and economic reforms, and integration into Euro-Atlantic and international structures and institutions [11]. Bohdan S. Kordan underlines that Ottawa’s policy towards Ukraine has been consistent at the macro-level. The author describes it as policy that is being subordinated to the national interest first of all. As he describes, democratization and development are traditional Canadian foreign policy objectives, so the support of Ukraine in these dimensions completely resonated with Canadian interests [7, p.7].

In historical retrospective we can name three main points which caused more active attention towards Ukraine from both official Ottawa and Ukrainian-Canadian community: 1991 (Declaration of Independence), 2004 (Orange revolution), 2013/2014 (Revolution of Dignity and Russian aggression towards Ukraine).

The proclamation of Ukraine’s independence as well as of other Soviet republics and the dissolution of the USSR was mostly unexpected, and it caused the necessity of an immediate decision on how to react. The issue of immediate recognition of Ukrainian independence was initiated by the representatives of the Ukrainian diaspora. They wrote special letter to then-Prime-Minister Brian Mulroney and initiated a private meeting with him to discuss events in Ukraine when Brian Mulroney visited the celebration of the 100th anniversary of Ukrainian settlement in Canada. As Ihor Broda recalls

(he was a vice president of the National Executive of the Ukrainian Canadian Congress at that time), Mulroney indicated that if Ukrainians approved the Declaration of Independence in December 1991 referendum, Canada would immediately grant official recognition and move to establish diplomatic relations with Ukraine [12].

Ukrainian Diaspora was very active in support of Ukraine's path to democracy from the very beginning. Diaspora initiated many forms of humanitarian assistance, a great variety of scholarships and numerous private funds, and this support and assistance needs a special research. Here only few illustrations would be named. For example, place for the first months of work for Ukrainian embassy was proposed by the Ukrainian Information Bureau of the Congress of Ukrainians of Canada (UCC). The Ukrainian Diaspora bought the building for the embassy and residence of the ambassador of Ukraine [4, p.125–126].

Another example: a special Canada-Ukraine Parliamentary Program (CUPP) was created by the Chair of Ukrainian Studies Foundation of Toronto since 1991. It was established by the Ukrainian Canadians in Canada as an internship for Ukrainian university students. The Mazurenko brothers, Ivan, Vasyl, Danylo made the initial financial contribution to the endowment of \$350,000. Other sources of sponsorship are the resources of the Chair of Ukrainian Studies Foundation, Ukrainian National Federation of Canada, and donations [9]. The Program provides scholarships to study at the University of Ottawa. And it is also gives an opportunity to work at the Parliament of Canada in the offices of Members of the House of Commons [13]. The CUPP is still working in 2020. As it is put on the official website of the CUPP, during the Program Ukrainian students learn about the principles of democratic government, parliamentary system and procedures in Canada. It was hoped that this program will contribute to the education of future leaders of Ukraine because it is aimed to give Ukrainian students an opportunity to observe parliamentary democracy and gain experience from which generations of students from developed democratic countries already have benefited.

The Canadian official readiness to support Ukraine was closely connected with the issues of security and especially with the problem of nuclear weapons as a legacy of the USSR. Many researchers explain that Ukraine was slower than it was expected in economic transformations. One of the reasons was the absence of international financial assistance until Ukraine gave up its nuclear weapons in 1994 [1, p. xvi].

Canada organized financing of support to Ukraine within the framework of the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which focused on Central and Eastern Europe in 1995. Since that time CIDA became re-

sponsible for Canada's official assistance aimed on the support of democratic development and economic liberalization initiatives in the mentioned region [14]. It was formed a special branch which covered Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union where processes of economic and political reform took place [15]. Among the main vectors of support there were named: humanitarian assistance, nuclear safety, transition to market-based economies, facilitation of Canadian trade and investment links with the region, and the encouragement of good governance, democracy and adherence to international norms [16]. Ukraine was included to the Renaissance Eastern Europe Program which was funded by the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade's Bureau of Assistance for Central and Eastern Europe, soon that program was subordinated to CIDA.

The same time the Canada-Ukraine Foundation (CUF) was established. It was announced in 1995 at the 18th Ukrainian Canadian Congress (UCC). The main aim was to coordinate, develop, organize and deliver assistance projects generated by Canadians and directed to Ukraine. As it is declared on the official website of CUF, the mission of this establishment is to assist Ukraine in the development of a democratic nation with a civil society by strengthening strategic partnerships in Canada and Ukraine [17].

We can find a lot of different initiatives that were aimed on the support of education in the field of democracy. Canadian government established a lot of programs administered by Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). Among projects of the technical co-operation, humanitarian assistance, and commercial credits we can name programs which are directly focused on the development of the civil society in Ukraine: Democratic education project (1997–2003) [18]. The project was aimed to support the development of knowledge and values relevant to the growth of civil society. It was focused on the development of a course on democratic studies at the university undergraduate level as well as in high schools throughout Ukraine, and a democratic political studies communications network. Recognizing that the educational system is the key delivery agent of new learning, the project will develop partnerships with key universities and pilot high schools throughout Ukraine with the aim of transferring knowledge of the subject matter and effective means of teaching.

Both official and diaspora's attention was paid to the slow progress of economic and political reforms in Ukraine. Canadian scholar Marta Dyczok considers that political transformation of Ukraine in the first years of independence was both fast and slow. In her opinion, the democratic system had been introduced with a variety of political parties, elections and changing of leaders, but real power remained in the hands of the old 'nomenklatura' [1, p. xvi].

Further development of Ukraine was considered as confrontation of the supporters and opponents of the reforms, accompanied by corruption and weakness of the press and other media to be a real watchdog of the government.

In general, in Canadian officials' rhetoric economic and political reforms in Ukraine supposed to be linked together for successful transit to democracy. During his visit Kyiv in 1999 then-Prime-minister Jean Chrétien mentioned unhealthy business climate, graft, cronyism, and bureaucratic red tape as significant obstacles to economical growth and democratic development [7, p. 51]. And we can find that Canadian authorities as well as representatives of Ukrainian Diaspora repeated many times about economic stagnation, growing poverty and anti-democratic forces which were named as traditional barriers for further movement towards prosperity of Ukraine.

Orange revolution was interpreted in Canada as renewed efforts for economic and political reform. Canadian press was mostly positive while depicting Ukrainian Orange revolution. The protests in the center of Kyiv as well as all over Ukraine were named as demand for real democracy for Ukraine [19]. Canadian support to Ukraine was focused on two main areas: sustainable economic growth and democratic development [20]. In 2004–2009 CIDA had invested more than \$99 million in different programs. Bohdan S. Kordan stresses that the Canadian government and Ukrainian-Canadian community cooperated in their support of liberal democratic changes in Ukraine during the Orange revolution. On his opinion this cooperation showed the emphasis on values and civic participation as an element of Canada's foreign policy course [7, p. 51]. In the Road-Map of the Main Priorities for Canada-Ukraine Relations (2009) both Canada and Ukraine were named as «democracies» [10]. It can be interpreted as a kind of proof that Ukraine was considered as successfully moving to the democratic type of the society. But there were a lot of critiques about the delaying of reforms.

Next turning point of Ukrainian modern history was Euromaidan and Revolution of Dignity. Events of Euromaidan were evaluated in Canada as the movement on respect and protect of humans rights and freedoms. Ukraine's path towards European and Euro-Atlantic structures was seen by Canada as an integral part of the further transit to democracy, so the refusal of official Kyiv to sign the Association Agreement with the EU received an immediate reaction from Canada. For example, there was canceled the meeting of then-Chairman of the Verkhovna Rada (Supreme Council) of Ukraine (parliament) with the Chairman of the Congress of Ukrainians of Canada, which testified to a clear signal from the Ukrainian Diaspora in Canada about the negative attitude to the decision to curtail European integration progress.

On November 30, 2013 then-Foreign Affairs Minister John Baird issued the statement where he underlined that Canada strongly condemned the deplorable use of violence by Ukrainian authorities against peaceful protesters and he stressed on that freedom of speech and freedom of assembly were and still are the fundamental tenets of any truly democratic country [21]. Such an attitude was confirmed later by then-Prime Minister Stephen Harper who characterised the decision by Ukrainian authorities to use riot police against peaceful protests as undemocratic and excessive [22]. Further clashes between protesters and security forces and the situation with violations of fundamental rights and freedoms have repeatedly been in the focus of official Canada. Actions in support of protesters took place in many Canadian cities, initiated mostly by representatives of the Ukrainian Diaspora.

Canadian mass-media mirrored the same attitudes: they described that Canada remained committed to long-term democratic development in Ukraine despite its recent tilt toward Russia and the violence that has spilled into its streets [23], underlined that Ukrainian people were fighting for the democratic standards that they deserve [24]. Official Canada proposed great assistance to Ukraine such as medical supplies, equipment and care for Ukrainian activists. The Government of Canada has also imposed numerous sanctions on key members of the former Yanukovich regime [25]. The main issue which was discussed was violence of human right, but soon this issue changed by the topic of Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Canada has defended Ukraine internationally. Official support for the territorial integrity of Ukraine was expressed by the Prime Ministers of Canada S. Harper and the current J. Trudeau, by the Ministers of Foreign Affairs (H. Freeland and the current F.-F. Champagne) and other high-ranking officials. Crimea, occupied by Russia, is recognized as Ukrainian. Since January 2014, Canada had committed more than \$785 million in assistance to Ukraine, using a range of instruments. These instruments include development, humanitarian and financial assistance; Peace and Stabilization Operations Program; the Canadian Police Arrangement etc. [26].

3. CONCLUSIONS AND PROSPECTS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

In general, we can summarize that both Canadian officials and Diaspora have mixed perceptions of the democratic developments in Ukraine. Canada's authorities are more soft and diplomatic while characterizing Ukraine's path to democracy and all the time repeating that «We supported Ukraine in its initial fight for democracy and reform» [26]. The representatives of Ukrainian Diaspora are more open and sincere in their dissatisfaction with democratic

developments in Ukraine. On the one hand, they were very enthusiastic about independence and the start of post-Soviet changes. On the other hand, we can find very pessimistic attitudes. For example, CUPP Director Ihor Bardyn speaks about «the non-democratic or soviet trained individuals, who resist change, especially if it comes from the younger generation» [27]. Canadian mass media also pays attention on the slow path towards the open civil society and flourishing market economy in Ukraine. For example Marc Montgomery (Radio Canada International) in his analysis of the 2020 World democracy Index, which shows the level of democracy in different countries, pays attention to that fact that Ukraine was determined as the country with ‘hybrid’ regime [28].

As the main threat towards democracy in Ukraine there are named corruption, delaying of reforms, institutional weakness (Bohdan S. Kordan [7, p. 8]), confrontation between ‘reform-minded’ and ‘old-thinking’ groups and the consolidation of the regional clans (Marta Dyczok [1, p. xvi]), the waves of Russification of Ukraine (Ihor Bardyn [28]). Among current outside threats the main focus is made on Russia.

This article is not covering all the nuances and dimensions of Canada’s perceptions on Ukrainian democratic development. It is necessary to point out vital topics which have to be studied in this field. It would be interesting to investigate the whole level of official Canada’s as well as Ukrainian Diaspora’s assistance to Ukraine to evaluate the real contribution of this country to the democratic development of the post-Soviet Ukraine.

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СТАВЛЕННЯ КАНАДИ ДО РОЗВИТКУ ДЕМОКРАТІЇ В НЕЗАЛЕЖНІЙ УКРАЇНІ

У статті здійснено узагальнювальний огляд ставлення Канади до демократичного розвитку пострадянської України. Розглянуто позицію та думку як офіційної, так і діаспорної Канади до розвитку демократії в Україні. Визначено, що загалом здобуття Україною незалежності стало своєрідним сигналом до початку інтенсивної співпраці та підтримки з боку Канади задля переходу в Україні від командно-адміністративної економіки до вільного ринку. Іншим важливим напрямом підтримки стала розбудова демократичних інститутів і громадянського суспільства. Допомога з боку офіційної Канади надходила через низку каналів, але основною інституцією стала Канадська агенція міжнародного розвитку. Іншою потужною силою й ініціатором багатьох проєктів та програм підтримки стала українська діаспора в Канаді. Можна говорити про три основні події, які сприяли пошвавленню уваги з боку офіційної Канади до України: це проголошення незалежності в 1991 р., Помаранчева революція 2004 р. та Євромайдан і Революція Гідності з кінця 2013 р. Кожна з цих подій позитивно оцінювалася Канадою, як офіційною, так і діаспорною, та інтерпретувалася як поштовх до потенційного просування до демократії. Попри позитивне й схвальне ставлення до розвитку транзиту до демократії

в пострадянській Україні, Канада критично ставиться до темпів цього транзиту та якості трансформаційних процесів. При цьому представники діаспори є більш відвертими у своїй критиці щодо проблем в Україні. Із-поміж основних перепон на цьому шляху називають корупцію, гальмування реформ, інституційну слабкість, конфронтацію між прибічниками та противниками реформ та регіональними кланами. Із 2014 р. після анексії Росією Криму також розглядається й зовнішній чинник. Канада потужно допомагає Україні в часи боротьби проти російської агресії, надаючи технічну, фінансову та дипломатичну допомогу.

Ключові слова: Канада, Україна, демократія, допомога.

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THE EVOLUTION OF THE US STRATEGY TOWARD THE NUCLEAR NONPROLIFERATION AFTER THE COLD WAR

The article analyzes the US strategy in the nonproliferation field during three decades (in 1990s – 2018) and during the presidency of four US presidents (Bill Clinton, George Bush, Barack Obama, and Donald Trump). The author considers the key guidelines of US nonproliferation strategy that are described in four Nuclear Posture Reviews (NPR) issued by each post-Cold War presidential administration. These documents describe the US nuclear policy in general, but the author focused on analysis of those their sections that were devoted to dealing with the risks of proliferation of nuclear weapons. The National Security Strategies of 1996 and 2002 were also analyzed in the article to clarify